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Abstract—This report investigates whether a vulnerability 
found in one web framework may be used to find a 
vulnerability in a different web framework. To test this 
hypothesis, several open source applications were installed 
in a secure test environment together with security analysis 
tools. Each one of the applications were developed using a 
different software framework. The results show that a 
vulnerability identified in one framework can often be used 
to find similar vulnerabilities in other frameworks. Cross-
site scripting security issues are the most likely to succeed 
when being applied to more than one framework. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Web Frameworks such as Ruby on Rails [1] and 
Microsoft’s ASP.NET, are technologies designed to 
support the development of web applications, web sites 
and web services. [2] believe that a benefit of their use is 
to improve software quality. If this were to be the case, it 
is not unreasonable to expect this to be reflected in a 
reduction in the number of security issues.  
[3] discusses maintainability as a major deciding factor 
when choosing between Ruby on Rails and the .NET 
framework. However there is no mention of security 
issues, or the possibility of any built-in vulnerability. The 
question is then whether web application frameworks can 
be relied upon to manage every aspect of security. To this 
end we have investigated some current security 
vulnerabilities relating to web based applications and 
frameworks.  
Several Web frameworks were selected that use 
different underlying technologies. These were ASP.Net, 
Ruby on Rails, and Cake PHP. These frameworks were 
then used to implement test applications whose security 
could be investigated in an isolated network lab. Web 
framework vulnerabilities are published in several web 
sites. These sites were used to find published security 
issues together with the Security Focus Bugtraq. We then 
tested our experimental hypothesis; that a vulnerability 
reported in one framework could be used to identify a 
similar vulnerability in an application built using a 
completely different framework. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Firstly we briefly 
review and describe the most common web application 
security failures [4]. Then we discuss how these apply to 
web framework based applications. Next we describe 
security testing environment used. Finally we present 
results that offer good support for our experimental 
hypothesis before moving on to discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
As network firewalls and security updates have become 
more common, network boundaries have become more 
secure. For this reason computer security hackers and 
crackers have moved their attention from the Network 
Layer [5] to the Application Layer [5], focusing on the 
websites themselves. Over seventy percent of attacks now 
occur at the application layer [6] and research by 
WhiteHat Security has found eight in ten websites have 
serious vulnerabilities [6]. 
A web application is a piece of software written in a 
browser supported language such as HTML, Java, PHP, 
C#.NET that is accessed using the http protocol. Http is 
stateless. Thus, when a resource is requested and a 
response received, the next request is dealt with by the 
server as a new, unique request. To achieve the 
appearance of state, web applications can use a Session 
Identifier (SID). This simulates a session on top of http 
[7]. Following a client request, the server creates and 
returns an SID. The client then includes this SID in all 
subsequent requests within the same session. 
We define a vulnerability as a weakness in a web 
application, web service or web site which can be caused 
by a programming error, design flaw or an implementation 
bug. Web applications and web services are vulnerable to 
a number of attacks [8]. Input manipulation attacks mainly 
occur via the application interface to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the application server. A number of 
different types of attack and security issue are discussed 
by [8] with the view of developing a validation framework 
for checking input before it is sent to the application 
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server. This would however only protect against people 
sending input to the application server via the input form. 
It would not protect against attacks that bypass client side 
validation by sending data directly to the application 
server.  
Web application security analysis tools are designed to 
target an application from an attacker's point of view [9]. 
Several programs are readily available and well known 
(e.g. BURP Suite[10]; OWASP WebScarab[4]; and Paros 
Proxy [11]). These have common features such as the 
ability to manipulate requests and responses, spider an 
application to obtain a list of files in the site, and utilities 
for encoding and decoding sensitive data. One feature of 
the BURP Suite program is to allow all hidden html form 
fields to be displayed and updated on the web page. This 
demonstrates that the use of such fields is completely 
insecure. 
A. Web Application Vulnerabilities 
The Open Web Application Security project, OWASP, 
[4] tracks the most common failures in the area and has 
identified Injection attacks, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), 
and Broken Authentication and Session Management, as 
three most common areas of weakness. Consequently, we 
further describe these as relevant to our investigation. 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is an injection attack by one 
user of a web site on other users [12]. The typical attack 
pattern involves a malicious user including JavaScript 
code in a web page such as a blog post or other user 
editable field such the web server then delivers the page to 
other users. The embedded JavaScript may then be used to 
steal the victim's session, or other data stored in cookies.  
A variation on XSS is cross site request forgery (XSRF, 
or CSRF). Here the payload JavaScript causes the victim 
to execute web requests with their network access and 
security privileges.  
[13] discuss how most XSS scanners check input and 
rely on either a testing or static taint analysis approach (a 
list of functions designated as input cleaners) to detect 
illicit JavaScript. [13] found that in most cases, even 
flawed validation code catches such exploits and the 
perpetrators of such attacks know this and create exploits 
to target known validation weaknesses. [13] therefore 
proposed an approach based firstly on an adapted string 
analysis which tracks untrusted string values. They 
secondly propose checking for untrusted scripts. This 
check is based on formal language techniques. [13] also 
discuss the limitations of such a proposal as it does not 
work for Domain-Object-Model (DOM) based Cross Site 
Scripting.  
In a further variation on XSS, an attacker could 
intercept web application traffic using an 'evil twin' rogue 
wireless access point, or comprised proxy server. Then 
using applications such as Burp Proxy [10,15] or 
Webscarab[16, 17] the attacker could inject JavaScript 
into the victims session in a  'man in the middle' attack. 
This would be equivalent in outcome to an XSS where 
JavaScript is stored on the server, and is worthy of further 
consideration.  
SQL injection is a well known attack style [18] to 
which all web applications could be vulnerable. The 
general principle is that attackers input SQL code in 
addition to the input expected from a normal user (such as 
name, or any user data).  
Using SQL injection techniques, a software hacker 
could take advantage of errors or vulnerabilities and use a 
web application to execute SQL statements against a 
database or to gain access to data files [18]. An attacker 
using SQL injection to insert code either directly in the 
URL or via form fields, could result in the system either 
giving access or returning an error supplying information 
about the system. 
SQL injection and cross-site scripting techniques 
belong to a type of security issue known as “taint-style 
vulnerabilities” [19]. Those authors suggested that issues 
of this type share a “source-sink” characteristic. This is 
explained by the fact the user entered values or “tainted 
values” enter a program at certain points and then are 
propagated throughout the program. Microsoft offer a tool 
to find SQL injection vulnerabilities in Active Server 
Pages [20]. 
SQL injection attacks are however somewhat generic in 
that most web applications could be potential targets. 
Consequently, we considered it them be out of the scope 
of this investigation as we are concentrating on web 
application frameworks.  
Several HTML tags may be used to inject cross site 
scripting using their attributes (e.g. href, style and src) and 
are also potentially dangerous. These tags at risk include 
applet, body, embed, frame, script, frameset, html, iframe, 
img, style, layer, link, ilayer, and object [21].  
Session Hijacking involves swapping a unique 
identifier belonging to one user with the unique identifier 
of another. Each user has a unique identifier which is used 
during their use of a web application. This starts with the 
server issuing a unique identifier to each user when the 
user logs in or navigates via the home page of a site [22]. 
Future requests include this unique number so web 
applications can identify users and associate them with 
distinct sessions. Sessions are hijacked to gain greater 
privileges in the application than those to which users 
would be entitled. Thus application administrators are 
potentially targets. 
A session could be hijacked by calculating the 
alphanumeric sequence of identifiers allocated by the 
application [23]. Indeed, WebScarab [16] will attempt to 
predict session keys based on the analysis of a large 
quantity of session data.  
A further way that a session could be stolen would be to 
use security analysis software to launch a man-in-the-
middle attack and copy the session information to another 
location for future use. Session identifiers can also be 
stored in cookies by applications and loaded each time the 
application starts. [24] considers session hijacking and 
how attacks performed by people eavesdropping via a 
network are commonly known as "sidejacking". [24] 
suggests that while Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [25] can 
help protect such attacks. The use of SSL is not an option 
in every case as it can affect the performance of the 
application. Also, SSL may not be considered when 
dealing with non sensitive data. [24] therefore proposes a 
JavaScript client/server solution which uses the benefits of 
SSL to encrypt the session key but the remaining data in 
the page would be transmitted using http sessions. Every 
http request from that point on would include an encrypted 
authentication code. For this solution to work a JavaScript 
library has to be included in each web page and this is 
used to generate the secret key.  
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[24] discusses two limitations of the proposed solution. 
Firstly that a Session Lock is totally dependent upon 
JavaScript being enabled. Secondly that Session Lock 
does not protect against an attacker either amending or 
adding code to the plain http request which could be used 
to steal the session key and to use it elsewhere. 
Consequently, whilst Session Lock is a good idea and 
protects against a certain type of attack, it is still 
susceptible to attackers changing or stealing data from the 
page, including the session key itself.  
In summary there are numerous types of attacks that 
can be performed against web applications [8]. XSS 
attacks are still considered to be a major threat against 
web applications and the security of web application data. 
III. THE EXPERIMENT 
Here we describe the isolated lan environment used to 
investigate the vulnerabilities described. A new 
application designed to receive data from the target 
applications is also discussed. Following this a description 
of the known security issues that were tested for is 
provided, and the application of the issues is then 
performed. Each test is described and a result of either 
success or failure allocated depending upon the test 
outcome. A summary of the findings is then given. 
The test environment was based on Microsoft Windows 
technologies. This was configured to safely test a cross 
section of available, modern technologies. This consisted 
of a laptop and a pc both running MS windows. Two 
installations of each application were required for Session 
Hijacking tests to facilitate the production of fake session 
ids.  
The applications chosen for testing were DASBlog. A 
blogger application based on Microsoft .NET framework ; 
RADIANT. A CMS application based on the Ruby on 
Rails, and DRUPAL, a CMS application based on the 
Cake PHP framework. 
A. Software Tools used in this experiment 
1) BURP-Proxy:  
Burp Proxy is a Java based web proxy server that 
allows user interaction. It is used for attacking and testing 
web applications [10, 15]. It functions as a man-in-the-
middle between the user’s browser and the target web 
server. This allows the user to intercept, and modify the 
raw http traffic between their browser and web server. 
Burp Proxy supports http request modification and can be 
used for attacks such as SQL injection, cookie 
interception, privilege escalation, Session Hijacking and 
buffer overflows.  
2) OWASP Webscarab:  
OWASP is the Open Web Application Security Project 
whose aim is the improvement of security of applications 
[4]. It offers an environment for testing and learning about 
security issues is using a Free, Open Source Software 
(FOSS) model. OWASP includes tools such as Webscarab 
for analyzing and discovering security issues in 
applications. Webscarab has a built in HTTP Proxy (with 
HTTPS interception), web-site crawler, session ID 
analysis, a script interface allowing for automation and a 
Base64 and MD5 encoder/decoder [4]. 
3) The Receiver Application  
The receiver is a web application written for this project 
as a repository of site specific data sent from the target 
applications. The receiver includes a number of web pages 
for processing and writing data to log files. This is done 
using JavaScript functions designed to be called from 
within the target applications. The functions are also used 
to insert data or JavaScript code into the application pages. 
B. Vulnerabilities and issues subject to testing 
We examined for three vulnerabilities1, Cross Site 
Scripting using JavaScript injection, Cross Site Scripting 
with HTML Object tag insertion, and Session Hijacking.  
For XSS vulnerabilities, the first test was to insert a 
JavaScript file from a remote site containing functions to 
extract information from within the applications. The 
JavaScript file was inserted into the login page of each 
application and then executed. Information sent from this 
function was sent to the receiver and logged.  
The second test was for XSS HTML Object tag 
insertion. Here we attempted to insert an html object tag 
into a field using the Burp Proxy intercept option. This 
was then saved by the application as part of the user data. 
This object was configured to point to the receiver 
application where JavaScript would be used to obtain data 
from the target application.  
The third test was Session Hijacking. Here we 
attempted to manipulate session information to give an 
ordinary user priveleged access. 
C. Applying the vulnerabilities to the target frameworks  
1) Test 1: XSS JavaScript injection. 
The purpose of this test was to investigate whether 
JavaScript from the receiver could be inserted into the 
login page and executed. Success would be achieved by 
including and executing a reference to a JavaScript file in 
the receiver site. Failure would be concluded if the 
JavaScript file could not be included successfully, or if the 
page did not subsequently function correctly, or if the 
JavaScript function was not executed.  
a) JavaScript injection in to the DasBlog 
application.  
The BURP proxy intercept option was used to add 
JavaScript to the DasBlog login page and to change the 
flow of the site by replacing the form submit button with 
one under our control. This was achieved by intercepting 
the message between the client and the server and 
inserting an html tag into the header section of the page. 
The purpose of this html was to call a JavaScript function 
in the receiver application. That is, to effect a cross site 
request forgery.  
Next, again using BURP Proxy, the original submit 
button used by the page was hidden by setting the type 
attribute in the control to hidden. An html image tag was 
then added to the page as the new submit button. Finally 
an onclick event was added to the new submit button with 
a reference to a JavaScript function ‘getFormValues’ in 
the newly added informerFunctions.js. 
The DasBlog Site was started and the login page 
displayed containing the newly inserted submit button. 
When the new submit button was pressed the page was 
submitted, the getFormValues JavaScript function sent the 
                                                          
1
 For details see [20-26]  
!"#$
&.' "!45!60.,(,
form data sent to the receiver application. The Event 
Target, Event Argument, ViewState, Event Validation, 
User Name and Password fields were also logged. This 
test was successful as the JavaScript was added to the 
login page, executed and the target data collected by the 
receiver. 
b) JavaScript injection in to the Radiant CMS 
application.  
The BURP proxy intercept option was used, as with 
DasBlog above, to replace the login form submit button 
with one connected to the inserted JavaScript library. Here 
the User Name, Password and Authenticity_Token (used 
by Radiant CMS for security purposes) fields were 
collected by the receiver. This test was again successful as 
the injected JavaScript allowed the receiver to collect 
confidential data. 
c) JavaScript injection in to the Drupal CMS 
application. 
The BURP proxy intercept option was again used as 
with DasBlog and Radiant CMS above to hide the original 
submit button and replace this with our custom JavaScript 
functions. The test was again successful as the JavaScript 
executed and the receiver collected the target data. 
The test was successful for all three applications, as the 
JavaScript function was added to the login pages in all 
three of the applications. The JavaScript was then 
executed and login information was sent to the receiver 
application and recorded in a log file. 
2) Test 2: XSS: HTML Object tag insertion.  
The purpose of this test was to see whether an html 
object tag could be added to a user input field. Here 
BURP Proxy’s intercept option was used in the test 
environment (see fig 1) to intercept the message between 
the client and the server and insert an html object tag. This 
was added to a new content or blog entry depending on 
the application. Success would be achieved if the html 
object tag were added to an application input field.  
a) HTML object tag insertion in to the DasBlog 
application.  
Two new blog entries were added, allowing a different 
version of the object tag to be added to the first line of 
each blog. These were added to the first line of the blog 
entry as this line is also displayed on the blogger site 
home page. The first entry was a plain text version titled 
Blog 2. The second was an encoded version added to an 
entry entitled encoded object. 
Next the entries were viewed on the home page of the 
site using the Firefox web browser. The new entries were 
visible on the DasBlog home page but the Encoded Object 
entry had been translated into a plain text format. The 
original plaintext version in object 2 was not visible 
(which is expected as the source object did not exist). The 
entries on the home page were then viewed using the 
Internet Explorer 7 browser. 
Launching the DASBlog web-site and logging in 
through IE7 revealed that the home page could no longer 
be viewed. Each time the home page was launched it 
forwarded itself on to the test address 
http://god/dasblog/www.mysite.com. This effectively 
made the application unusable in IE7. We considered this 
test to be successful as the object tag was added to the 
blog page and saved by the system. However, the 
application was unusable in Internet Explorer as the home 
page could not be reached and every action forwarded the 
application on to an unreachable url. Since this was a 
serious bug it was logged in the DASBlogIssue Tracker on 
codePlex (issue number 4183). 
b) HTML object tag insertion in to the Radiant 
application. 
As with DasBlog, the BURP proxy intercept option was 
used to add the html object tag to a new content entry on 
page submission. Next the entry was viewed on the home 
page of the site using the Firefox web browser. The new 
entry was visible on the Radiant home page pointing to 
the the receiver application application which has been 
inserted in to the page. An html tag defining an object 
with an invalid Url was then inserted. However, the 
Invalid object was ignored by the Radiant application and 
neither the target application nor the html tag were 
displayed. This test was successful as the object tag was 
added to the content page and saved by the application. 
The object displayed the target Receiver Application in 
the page. The application did handle incorrectly 
configured object tags. 
c) HTML object tag insertion in to the Drupal 
application.  
 Two new content pages were added, allowing a 
different version of the object tag to be added to the first 
line of each. On Test 1 the object is not displayed. On Test 
2 the encoded text has been converted and the object tag 
displayed. This test was consequently a failure as the 
object tag was handled correctly by the application and 
disallowed. 
3) Test 3: Session Hijacking.   
This method of attack was reported on a Ruby site 
forum and had been used to attack the Radiant CMS 
application [27]. The purpose of this test was to 
investigate whether the session information used by the 
applications to manage security levels and system access 
could be manipulated to give a standard user a higher 
level of access. Again the BURP Proxy security analysis 
tool was used in the test environment shown in fig 1, 
using the receiver application to record data. Success 
would be demonstrated by gaining a higher level of access 
in the system or by gaining access without using a user 
credentials for example, bypassing the login screen.  
a) Session Hijacking: DASBlog.  
The BURP proxy intercept option was used to change 
the session information used by the DASBlog application 
and the options available to the user were then observed.  
The administrator’s session information can be gained 
by either accessing the administrator users stored cookie 
information, which in the case of the Windows operating 
system is located within their roaming profile. Or, as used 
in this case a separate test version of the application was 
used to generate valid administrator session details which 
were used within the live application.  
The test DASBlog site was launched and the 
administrator’s account used to login. On login the form 
details including the session value were passed and logged 
by the receiver application. The live DASBlog application 
was launched using a direct url pointing to a page within 
the site rather than the login page. The BURP Proxy 
intercept option was then used to locate and replace the 
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DASBlog ASP session value with the value obtained by 
the receiver application. This was repeated for each 
message that contained the session value.  
The DasBlog application was launched and the user 
was presented with a blog view page. It was then possible 
to select, edit and delete any blog entry. This type of 
functionality can normally only be performed by the site 
administrator account. This test was successful as the site 
was accessed with administrator access without entering a 
user name or password. Radiant:  Thus, for DasBlog type 
of functionality can normally only be performed by the 
site administrator account whilst access had been enabled 
for an ordinary user. 
b) Session Hijacking.  Radiant  
Here we proceeded as for DasBlog using a test and live 
application. The test Radiant site was launched and the 
administrators account used to login. On login the form 
details including the session value were passed and logged 
by the receiver application. The Live Radiant application 
was launched using a direct url pointing to a page within 
the site rather than the login page. The BURP Proxy 
intercept option was then used to locate and replace the 
Radiant session value with the value obtained by the 
receiver application. This was repeated for each message 
that contained the session value.  
The Radiant application was launched and the user was 
presented with a content administration page for 
maintaining users and configuring site preferences. This 
functionality can normally only be performed by the site 
administrator account, and is consequently a significant 
security vulnerability. 
c) Session Hijacking: Drupal.   
Here we proceeded as above taking an administrator 
session id from a correctly authorized session on a test 
site, and using this key in a live Drupal site. However, the 
'create content' page was exactly the same as would be 
presented to an anonymous user. Changing the session 
information had no effect. Thus, for Drupal this test failed. 
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
We chose three common vulnerabilities to investigate. 
The first was to apply a XSS vulnerability to each of the 
applications. Weakness in application security allowed 
JavaScript to be injected into a web page before the page 
was rendered by the browser on the client machine.  
For the first test, an XSS, JavaScript injection 
vulnerability was found for all three applications tested, as 
JavaScript was added and displayed within the client web 
browser.  
The second test was to apply a XSS, HTML Object tag 
insertion vulnerability. Application weakness allowed 
JavaScript to be injected into an input field in a web page. 
The injected JavaScript was then saved by each 
application to either a database or an XML file. This 
vulnerability was successful for two of the three 
applications tested.  
The third test Session Hijacking used a second 
installation of each application to generate a session key 
that was usable to gain access to the first installation. The 
vulnerability gave administrator access to two of the 
applications, removing the need to login using a user 
name and password. The DRUPAL application alone did 
not allow access via this method.  
These results are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Summary of Vulnerabilities 
Did the expected vulnerabilities exist? Application  
XSS 
JavaScript 
injection 
XSS 
HTML tag 
injection 
Session 
Hijacking 
DASBlog  Yes Yes Yes 
Radiant 
CMS 
Yes Yes Yes 
DRUPAL 
CMS 
Yes No No 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has reported an investigation into the 
security issues of web based frameworks. Its hypothesis 
was that a vulnerability found in one web based 
framework can be used to uncover a similar vulnerability 
in a different framework. For example, the Session 
Hijacking issue tested against the Radiant CMS 
application was originally reported on the Radiant Issue 
log site. This was then used to uncover the same issue 
with the DASBlog application. 
New vulnerabilities were also found as a result of the 
testing. Using the BURP Proxy application allowed an 
html object tag to be inserted into the content field of a 
new blog in the DASBlog application. This highlighted a 
serious issue, if the path specified in the object tag was 
invalid, the application was rendered unusable in Internet 
Explorer. This was reported on the DASBlog issue tracker 
as a number of sites use this application and are 
potentially vulnerable. 
All web based frameworks provide and recommend 
security features to protect application data from 
malicious code. However, the majority expect malicious 
code to be inserted in to form fields. Using XSS, 
JavaScript injection and a proxy-server it is possible to 
inject the malicious code in to any section of the web 
page, or remove any existing protective code from a web 
page.  
This paper has shown that any person with a proxy 
server can read, extract and manipulate the data sent. This 
would allow a man-in-the-middle to change web pages 
sent from a web server, before the page arrived on the 
client machine. Unfortunately people with this ability are 
constantly around us as whenever we visit a hotel, a coffee 
shop or other location using a proxy server.  
There are currently internet sites that inform the users 
of the site that a built in proxy server is used to protect 
their identity. As all of the messages are travelling through 
the proxy server, the site could be used to manipulate the 
data and pages in the ways described in this paper. 
If there are sites that advertise the use of built in proxy 
servers, there will be sites or more importantly search 
engines that do not advertise the fact, leaving the users of 
the site vulnerable. 
The underlying frameworks do provide security 
features to test and clean scripts from input and hidden 
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fields, but the page content in its entirety is not validated. 
Would it be possible to develop a security technique to 
ensure that the page displayed within the client browser is 
exactly as expected? If any extra lines of code exist could 
a warning be displayed to inform the user? For example, 
could a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) be performed 
on the data to ensure that data received had not been 
changed in anyway? [28] discuss and demonstrate a 
method used to manipulate data in a way that is not 
detectable to a CRC. Although [28] demonstrates the 
theory on business application data, It does bring into 
doubt the usability of CRC to guarantee successful 
delivery of web based communications.  
This report has shown that there is fair evidence to 
support our hypothesis: that a vulnerability found in one 
web framework may be used to find a vulnerability in 
another, entirely separate web framework. 
Our future work will consider potential defenses against 
these types of attacks against web framework based 
applications. 
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